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Abstract
Deep networks have achieved impressive results
across a variety of important tasks. However a
known weakness is a failure to perform well when
evaluated on data which differ from the training
distribution, even if these differences are very
small, as is the case with adversarial examples.
We propose Fortified Networks, a simple transfor-
mation of existing networks, which fortifies the
hidden layers in a deep network by identifying
when the hidden states are off of the data manifold,
and maps these hidden states back to parts of the
data manifold where the network performs well.
Our principal contribution is to show that fortify-
ing these hidden states improves the robustness
of deep networks and our experiments (i) demon-
strate improved robustness to standard adversarial
attacks in both black-box and white-box threat
models; (ii) suggest that our improvements are
not primarily due to the gradient masking prob-
lem and (iii) show the advantage of doing this
fortification in the hidden layers instead of the
input space.
1. Introduction
Deep neural networks have been very successful across a
variety of tasks. This success has also driven applications in
domains where reliability and security are critical, including
self-driving cars (Bojarski et al., 2016), health care, face
recognition (Sharif et al., 2017), and the detection of mal-
ware (LeCun et al., 2015). Security concerns emerge when
an agent using the system could benefit from the system
performing poorly. Reliability concerns come about when
the distribution of input data seen during training can differ
from the distribution on which the model is evaluated.
Adversarial examples (Goodfellow et al., 2014) is a method
to attack neural network models. This attack applies a small
perturbation to the input that changes the predicted class. It
is notable that it is possible to produce a perturbation small
enough that it is not noticeable with a naked eye. It has
been shown that simple gradient methods allow one to find
a modification of the input that often changes the output
class (Szegedy et al., 2013; Goodfellow et al., 2014). More
recent work demonstrated that it is possible to create a patch
such that even when presented on the camera, it changes the
output class with high confidence (Brown et al., 2017).
Defences against adversarial examples have been devel-
oped as a response. Some of the most prominent classes
of defences include feature squeezing (Xu et al., 2017),
adapted encoding of the input (Jacob Buckman, 2018), and
distillation-related approaches (Papernot et al., 2015). Ex-
isting defenses provide some robustness but most are not
easy to deploy. In addition, many have been shown to be
vulnerable to gradient masking. Still others require training
a generative model directly in the visible space, which is
still difficult today even on relatively simple datasets.
Our goal is to provide a method which (i) can be gener-
ically added into an existing network; (ii) robustifies the
network against adversarial attacks and (iii) provides a re-
liable signal of the existence of input data that do not lie
on the manifold on which it the network trained. The abil-
ity of generative models, used directly on the input data,
to improve robustness is not new. Our main contribution
is that we employ this robustification on the distribution
on the learned hidden representations instead making the
identification of off-manifold examples easier Figure 1.
We propose Fortified Networks R. Fortification consists of
using denoising autoencoders to “decorate” the hidden lay-
ers of the original network. We use “decoration” in the
Pythonic sense that it can be applied to any function (in this
case a part of the network) and extend its behavior without
explicitly modifying it. Fortification meets all three goals
stated above. We discuss the intuition behind the fortifi-
cation of hidden layers and lay out some of the method’s
salient properties. We evaluate our proposed approach on
MNIST, Fashion-MNIST, CIFAR10 datasets against white-
box and blackbox attacks.
The rest of the paper is structured in the following way.
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Figure 1. Illustration of the autoencoder dynamics in the input space (top) and in abstract hidden space (bottom). The leftmost panels
show data points from three different classes, the middle panels show vector fields describing the autoencoder dynamics, and the rightmost
panels show a number of resulting trajectories and basins of attraction. The key motivation behind Fortified Networks is that directions
which point off the data manifold are easier to identify in an abstract space with simpler statistical structure, making it easier to map
adversarial examples back to the projected data manifold.
Section 2 gives a detailed overview of the background on
the adversarial attacks and denoising autoencoders used in
this work. Section 3 presents our proposed methods for the
defence against adversarial examples, Section 4 describes
the experimental procedure and Section 5 provides the ex-
perimental results and a comparison to previous approaches.
Finally, Section 6 puts this work into the context of previous
publications and Section 7 concludes.
2. Background
2.1. The Empirical Risk Minimization Framework
Let us consider a standard classification task with an under-
lying data distribution D over pairs of examples x ∈ Rd
and corresponding labels y ∈ [k]. We also assume that
we are given a suitable loss function L(θ, x, y), for in-
stance the cross-entropy loss for a neural network. As
usual, θ ∈ Rp is the set of model parameters. Our goal
then is to find model parameters θ that minimize the risk
E(x,y)∼D[L(x, y, θ)]. This expectation cannot be computed,
therefore a common approach is to to minimize the empir-
ical risk 1/N
∑
D L(x, y, θ) taking into account only the
examples in a given dataset D.
2.2. Adversarial Attacks and Robustness
While the empirical risk minimization framework has been
very successful and often leads to excellent generalization,
it has the significant limitation that it doesn’t guarantee
robustness, and more specifically performance on examples
off the data manifold. Madry et al. (2017) proposed an
optimization view of adversarial robustness, in which the
adversarial robustness of a model is defined as a min-max
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problem
min
θ
ρ(θ), where (1)
ρ(θ) = E(x,y)∼D
[
max
δ∈S
L(θ, x+ δ, y)
]
. (2)
2.3. Denoising Autoencoders
Denoising autoencoders (DAEs) are neural networks which
take a noisy version of an input (for example, an image)
and are trained to predict the noiseless version of that input.
This approach has been widely used for feature learning
and generative modeling in deep learning (Bengio et al.,
2013a). More formally, denoising autoencoders are trained
to minimize a reconstruction error or negative log-likelihood
of generating the clean input. For example, with Gaussian
log-likelihood of the clean input given the corrupted input,
r the learned denoising function, C a corruption function
with Gaussian noise of variance σ2, the reconstruction loss
is
L̂ = 1
N
N∑
n=1
(∥∥∥r(Cσ(x(n)))− x(n)∥∥∥2
2
)
. (3)
Alain et al. (2012) demonstrated that with this loss function,
an optimally trained denoising autoencoder’s reconstruction
vector is proportional to the gradient of the log-density:
rσ(x)− x
σ2
→ ∂ log p(x)
∂x
as σ → 0. (4)
This theory establishes that the reconstruction vectors from
a well-trained denoising autoencoder form a vector field
which points in the direction of the data manifold. How-
ever, Alain et al. (2012) showed that this may not hold for
points which are distant from the manifold, as these points
are rarely sampled during training. In practice, denoising
autoencoders are not just trained with tiny noise but also
with large noises, which blurs the data distribution as seen
by the learner but makes the network learn a useful vector
field even far from the data.
3. Fortified Networks
We propose the use of DAEs inserted at crucial points be-
tween layers of the original neural network in order to clean
up the transformed data points which may lie away from the
original data manifold. Intuitively, the method aims to regu-
larize the hidden representations by keeping the activations
on the surface of the corresponding projected data mani-
fold through the application of a DAE trained on the hidden
representations (on the original clean data). We argue that
applying the DAEs on the hidden layers—as opposed to
the raw input signal—facilitates learning, while providing a
stronger protection from adversarial attacks. As illustrated
in Figure 1, we hypothesize that more abstract representa-
tions associated with deeper networks are easier to clean
up because the transformed data manifolds are flatter. The
flattening of data manifolds in the deeper layers of a neu-
ral network was first noted experimentally by Bengio et al.
(2013b). We provide experimental support for these claims
in Section 4.
R Layer fortification R Our method works by substitut-
ing a hidden layer hk with a denoised version. We feed the
signal hk through the encoder network,Ek, and decoder net-
work, Dk, of a DAE for layer k, which yields the denoised
version, hdecodedk :
hdecodedk = Dk(Ek(hk + nk)), (5)
where nk is white Gaussian noise of variance σ2 and appro-
priate shape. We call the resulting layer, a fortified layer and
the resulting network the fortified network corresponding to
the original network.
For training purposes, we treat the DAEs as part of the forti-
fied network, backpropagate through and train all weights
jointly. Aside from the original classification loss, Lc, we
also include the classification loss from the adversarial ob-
jective, Lc(y˜) and we introduce a dual objective for the
DAEs.
• Reconstruction loss. For a mini-batch of N
clean examples, x(1), . . . , x(N), each hidden layer
h
(1)
k , . . . , h
(N)
k is fed into a DAE loss, similar to (3):
Lrec,k = 1
N
N∑
n=1
∥∥∥Dk (Ek (h(n)k + nk))− h(n)k ∥∥∥2
2
.
• Adversarial loss. We use some adversarial training
method to produce the perturbed version of the mini-
batch, x˜(1), . . . , x˜(N), where x˜(i) is a small perturba-
tion of x(i) which is designed to make the network
produce the wrong answer. The corresponding hidden
layer h˜(1)k , . . . , h˜
(N)
k (using the perturbed rather than
original input) is fed into a similar DAE loss:
Ladv,k = 1
N
N∑
n=1
∥∥∥Dk (Ek (h˜(n)k + nk))− h(n)k ∥∥∥2
2
,
where we note that the target reconstruction for denois-
ing is the clean version of the hidden layer, without
noise and without adversarial perturbation.
To build a fortified network, we can apply this fortification
process to some or all the layers. The final objective used
for training the fortified network includes the classification
loss and all reconstruction and adversarial losses:
L = Lc(y) + Lc(y˜) + λrec
∑
k
Lrec,k + λadv
∑
k
Ladv,k,
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Figure 2. An illustration of the process of mapping back to the manifold in the visible space (left) and the hidden space (right). The shaded
regions represent the areas in the space which are occupied by data points from a given class (they do not represent decision boundaries).
where λrec > 0 and λadv > 0 tune the strength of the DAE
terms. This kind of training process allows for the produc-
tion of hidden representations robust to small perturbations,
and in particular, to adversarial attacks.
Off-manifold signaling The reconstruction losses act as
a reliable signal for detecting off-manifold examples (cf.
Section 4). This is a particularly useful property in practice:
not only can we provide more robust classification results,
we can also sense and suggest to the analyst or system
when the original example is either adversarial or from a
significantly different distribution.
Motivation for when and where to use fortified layers
We have discussed advantages to placing fortified layers in
the hidden states instead of the input space (with further
discussion in section 6.1), but the question of where exactly
fortified layers need to be placed remains unanswered. Is
it just the final hidden layer? Is it every hidden layer? We
outline two important considerations regarding this issue:
1. In the higher-level hidden layers, it is much easier for
the network to identify points which are off of the
manifold or close to the margin. The former is directly
experimentally demonstrated in 4.
2. At the same time, the higher level hidden layers may
already look like points that are not adversarial due to
the effect of the adversarial perturbations in the earlier
layers. While we are not aware of any formal study of
this phenomenon, it is clearly possible (imagine for ex-
ample a fortified layer on the output from the softmax,
which could only identify unnatural combinations of
class probabilities).
3. Given these opposing objectives, we argue for the in-
clusion of multiple fortified layers across the network.
In the next section we describe a number of experiments to
evaluate the practical merit of Fortified Networks.
4. Experiments
4.1. Attacks
We evaluated the performance of our model as a defense
against adversarial attacks. We focused on two of the most
popular and well-studied attacks. Firstly, we consider the
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM, Goodfellow et al.,
2014) which is popular as it only requires a single step
and can still be effective against many networks. Secondly,
we consider the projected gradient descent attack (Kurakin
et al., 2016) which is slower than FGSM as it requires many
iterations, but has been shown to be a much stronger attack
(Madry et al., 2017).
Additionally, we consider both white-box attacks (where the
attackers knows the model) and black-box attacks (where
they don’t, but they have access to the training set).
4.1.1. FAST GRADIENT SIGN METHOD
The Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) (Goodfellow et al.,
2014) is a simple one-step attack that produces `∞-bounded
adversaries via the following gradient based perturbation.
x˜ = x+ ε sgn(∇xL(θ, x, y)). (6)
4.1.2. PROJECTED GRADIENT DESCENT
The projected gradient descent attack (Madry et al., 2017),
sometimes referred to as FGSMk, is a multi-step extension
of the FGSM attack characterized as follows:
xt+1 = Πx+S
(
xt + α sgn(∇xL(θ, x, y))
)
(7)
initialized with x0 as the clean input x and with the cor-
rupted input x˜ as the last step in the sequence.
4.2. The Gradient Masking and Gradient Obfuscation
Problem
A significant challenge with evaluating defenses against ad-
versarial attacks is that many attacks rely upon a network’s
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Figure 3. Diagram illustrating a one-layer fortified network. A network is evaluated with a data sample x and its corresponding adversarial
example x˜. Hidden units hk and h˜k are corrupted with noise, encoded with the encoder Enc, and decoded with the decoder Dec. The
autoencoder (denoted by the red color) is trained to reconstruct the hidden unit hk that corresponds to the clean input. Dotted lines are two
reconstruction costs: for a benign (Lrec) and adversarial examples (Ladv). Note that a layer can be fortified at any position in the network.
gradient. Methods which reduce the quality of this gradient,
either by making it flatter or noisier can lead to methods
which lower the effectiveness of gradient-based attacks, but
which are not actually robust to adversarial examples (Atha-
lye et al., 2017; Papernot et al., 2016b). This process, which
has been referred to as gradient masking or gradient obfus-
cation, must be analyzed when studying the strength of an
adversarial defense.
One method for studying the extent to which an adversarial
defense gives deceptively good results as a result of gradient
masking relies on the observation that black-box attacks are
a strict subset of white-box attacks, so white-box attacks
should always be at least as strong as black-box attacks. If
a method reports much better defense against white-box
attacks, it suggests that the selected white-box attack is un-
derpowered as a result of gradient masking. Another test
for gradient masking is to run an iterative search, such as
projected gradient descent (PGD) with an unlimited range
for a large number of iterations. If such an attack is not com-
pletely successful, it indicates that the model’s gradients are
not an effective method for searching for adversarial images,
and that gradient masking is occurring. Still another test is
to confirm that iterative attacks with small step sizes always
outperform single-step attacks with larger step sizes (such
as FGSM). If this is not the case, it may suggest that the
iterative attack becomes stuck in regions where optimization
using gradients is poor due to gradient masking.
4.3. Reconstruction Error as a Heuristic for Deviation
from the Manifold
The theory in Alain et al. (2012) established that a
well-trained denoising autoencoder’s reconstruction vector
r(x) − x points in the direction of the gradient of the log-
density. Thus, critical points in the model’s log-density will
have a reconstruction error of zero. While it is not guaran-
teed to hold for arbitrary densities, we investigated whether
reconstruction error can serve as a practical heuristic for
how much a point deviates from the data manifold. If each
data point were a local maximum in the log-density and the
log-density has no other critical points, then points on the
data manifold are guaranteed to have lower reconstruction
error.
5. Results
For details about the specifics of our model architectures and
hyperparameters we refer readers to Sections A.1 and A.2
of the Appendix. With all experiments, we use the same
attacks (with identical parameters) at training and test time
to generate adversarial examples. An important point to note
here is that all of the autoencoders in our fortified layers
used a single hidden layer with tied weights. In the case
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of convolutional autoencoders we always used a stride of 1
and (5,5) kernels.
Table 1. Accuracies against white-box MNIST attacks with FGSM,
where the model is a convolutional net. We used the standard
FGSM attack parameters with an ε of 0.3 and compare against
published adversarial training defenses. We also performed
ablations where we considered removing the reconstruction error
on adversarial examples Ladv as well as switching the activation
function in the fortified layers from leaky relu to tanh, which
we found to slightly help in this case. While our baseline and
pre-fortified networks used relu activations, we found that by
using a leaky relu in all layers the accuracy on FGSM ε = 0.3
could be improved to 99.2% with standard adversarial training,
suggesting that both our own baselines and those reported in the
past have been too weak.
Model FGSM
Adv. Train (Madry et al., 2017) 95.60
Adv. Train (Jacob Buckman, 2018) 96.17
Adv. Train (ours) 96.36
Adv. Train No-Rec (ours) 96.47
Quantized (Jacob Buckman, 2018) 96.29
One-Hot (Jacob Buckman, 2018) 96.22
Thermometer (Jacob Buckman, 2018) 95.84
Our Approaches
Fortified Network - Conv, w/o Ladv 96.46
Fortified Network - Conv 97.97
We also ran the above experiment with FGSM and an ε of
0.1 to compare directly with (Erraqabi et al., 2018) and
obtain 98.34% accuracy on adversarial examples compared
to their 96.10%.
Table 2. Accuracies against white-box MNIST attacks with PGD
with an ε of 0.1, where our model is a convnet.
Model PGD
Baseline Adv. Train 96.98
Fortified Network - Conv (ours) 98.09
5.1. Recurrent Networks
RNNs are often trained using teacher forcing, which refers
to the use of the ground-truth samples yt being fed back into
the model and conditioning the prediction of later outputs.
These fed back samples force the RNN to stay close to the
ground-truth sequence. However, when generating at test
time, during the ground truth sequence is not available. We
investigated if Fortified Networks could be used to detect
Table 3. Accuracies against white-box CIFAR attacks with
FGSM using (ε = 0.3), where each model is a convnet. Our
baseline adversarial training is the resnet model provided in
(Nicolas Papernot, 2017)
Model FGSM
Baseline Adv. Train 79.57
Fortified Networks - Conv (ours) 80.47
Table 4. Accuracies against white-box CIFAR attacks with FGSM
using the standard (ε = 0.03), where each model is a convnet.
Our baseline adversarial training is the resnet model provided in
(Nicolas Papernot, 2017)
Model FGSM
Baseline Adv. Train (ours) 79.34
Quantized (Buckman) 53.53
One-Hot (Buckman) 68.76
Thermometer (Buckman) 80.97
Fortified Networks (ours)
Autoencoder on input space
with loss in hidden states 79.77
Autoencoder in hidden space 81.80
when sampling from a teacher-forcing model moves off the
manifold. To this end we train a language model on the
standard Text8 dataset, which is derived from Wikipedia
articles. We trained a single-layer LSTM with 1000 units
at the character-level, and included fortified layers between
the hidden states and the output on each time step. As seen
in table 7, the ratios of these reconstruction errors increases
steadily as we increase the number of sampling steps and
diverge away from the distribution of training sequences,
providing empirical support for the notion that fortified
layers effectively measure when the data moves off of the
training manifold.
6. Related Work
6.1. Using Generative Models as a Defense
The observation that adversarial examples often consist of
points off of the data manifold and that deep networks may
not generalize well to these points motivated (Gu & Rigazio,
2014; Ilyas et al., 2017; Pouya Samangouei, 2018; Liao
et al., 2017) to consider the use of the generative models
as a defense against adversarial attacks. Ilyas et al. (2017);
Gilmer et al. (2018) also showed the existence of adversarial
examples which lie on the data manifold, and (Ilyas et al.,
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Table 5. Accuracies against white-box attacks on Fashion
MNIST. For PGD we used ε = 0.1 and for FGSM we
experimented with ε = 0.1 and ε = 0.3. Compared with
DefenseGAN (Pouya Samangouei, 2018).
Model FGSM(ε = 0.1)
FGSM
(ε = 0.3)
PGD
(ε = 0.1)
DefenseGAN n/a 89.60 n/a
Our Approaches
Baseline Adv. Train
- Conv,ReLU 86.14 90.66 77.49
Baseline Adv. Train
- Conv,LReLU 89.10 88.8 77.90
Fortified Nets - Conv
(ours) 89.86 91.31 79.54
2017) showed that training against adversarial examples
forced to lie on the manifold is an effective defense. Our
method shares a closely related motivation to these prior
works, with a key difference being that we propose to con-
sider the manifold in the space of learned representations,
instead of considering the manifold directly in the visible
space. One motivation for this is that the learned represen-
tations have a simpler statistical structure (Bengio et al.,
2012), which makes the task of modeling this manifold and
detecting unnatural points much simpler. Learning the dis-
tribution directly in the visible space is still very difficult
(even state of the art models fall short of real data on metrics
like Inception Score) and requires a high capacity model.
Additionally working in the space of learned representations
allows for the use of a relatively simple generative model,
in our case a small denoising autoencoder.
Ilyas et al. (2017) proposed to work around these challenges
from working in the visible space by using the Deep Image
Prior instead of an actual generative model. While this
has the advantage of being a model that doesn’t require a
special training procedure (as deep image prior is a separate
optimization process for each example) it may be limited in
the types of adversarial attacks that it’s resistant to, and it
would provide no defense against adversarial attacks which
are in the range of a convolutional network, which have
been shown to exist (Chaowei Xiao, 2018).
Another key difference between our work and (Ilyas et al.,
2017; Pouya Samangouei, 2018) is that both DefenseGAN
and the Invert-and-Classify approach use an iterative search
procedure at inference time to map observed data points
onto nearby points on the range of the generator. On the
other hand, our approach uses small denoising autoencoders
that are used in the same way (i.e. a simple forward appli-
Table 6. Accuracies against blackbox MNIST attacks with
adversarial training. Reporting 50/50 results compared to
previous works (Jacob Buckman, 2018, JB) and (Pouya Saman-
gouei, 2018, PS). The test error on clean examples is in parenthesis.
Model FGSM
OneHot (JB) 95.96 (98.83)
ThermoEnc (JB) 96.97 (98.08)
DefenseGAN fc→conv (PS) 92.21 (n/a)
DefenseGAN conv→conv (PS) 93.12 (n/a)
Adv. Train fc→conv (PS) 96.68 (n/a)
Adv. Train conv→conv (PS) 96.54 (n/a)
Our Approaches
Baseline Adv. Train 93.83 (98.95)
Fortified Network w/o Ladv , Lrec 96.98 (99.17)
Fortified Network 97.82 (98.93)
Table 7. We trained Fortified Networks on a single-layer LSTM
on the Text-8 dataset, with fortified layers added between each
step. We recorded the ratio between reconstruction error on the
testing set during both teacher forcing mode and sampling mode
(where the model is supplied with its own outputs as inputs for the
next step). The motivation is that the outputs should gradually
move off of the manifold with more sampling steps, which is
indicated by a high reconstruction error ratio, which makes it
an interesting tool for monitoring or potentially fixing this problem.
Sampling Steps Error Ratio
50 1.03
180 1.12
300 1.34
cation) during both training and testing. The use of such
an iterative procedure presents challenges for evaluation,
as it is possible for gradients to vanish while doing back-
propagation through such a procedure, which may lead to
an overestimate in the strength of the defense due to the
gradient masking problem (Papernot et al., 2016a; Athalye
et al., 2018). One indicator of the gradient masking prob-
lem is black-box attacks outperforming white-box attacks,
which is an indicator of under-powered attacks as black-box
attacks are a strict subset of white-box attacks. This indi-
cator of gradient obfuscation was present in the work of
Pouya Samangouei (2018) where black-box attacks were
generally stronger against their defense, but with our method
we observe very similar defense quality against black-box
and white-box attacks.
(Gu & Rigazio, 2014; Liao et al., 2017) both considered
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Figure 4. We added fortified layers with different capacities to
MLPs trained on MNIST, and display the value of the total re-
construction errors for adversarial examples divided by the total
reconstruction errors for clean examples. A high value indicates
that adversarial examples have high reconstruction error. We con-
sidered fortified layers with autoencoders of different capacities.
Our results support the central motivation for fortified networks:
that off-manifold points can much more easily be detected in the
hidden space (as seen by the relatively constant ratio for the autoen-
coder in h space) and are much harder to detect in the input space
(as seen by this ratio rapidly falling to zero as the autoencoder’s
capacity is reduced).
using an autoencoder as a pre-processing step in the input
space. Interestingly (Liao et al., 2017) used a loss func-
tion defined in the space of the hidden states, but still used
autoencoders directly in the input space.
6.2. Adversarial Hidden State Matching
Erraqabi et al. (2018) demonstrate that adversarially match-
ing the hidden layer activations of regular and adversarial
examples improves robustness. This work shared the same
motivation of using the hidden states to improve robustness,
but differed in that they used an adversarial objective and
worked in the original hidden states instead of using a gen-
erative model (in our case, the DAE in the fortified layers).
We present direct experimental comparisons with their work
in section 5.
6.3. Denoising Feature Matching
Warde-Farley & Bengio (2016) proposed to train a denois-
ing autoencoder in the hidden states of the discriminator in
a generative adversarial network. The generator’s parame-
ters are then trained to make the reconstruction error of this
autoencoder small. This has the effect of encouraging the
generator to produce points which are easy for the model to
reconstruct, which will include true data points. Both this
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Figure 5. We ran a fortified network on Fashion-MNIST using ad-
versarial training with PGD for a variety of ε values, each for 5
epochs. The motivation behind this experiment, suggested by Atha-
lye et al. (2018) is confirming if unbounded (ε = 1) adversarial
attacks are able to succeed. A defense which succeeds primarily
by masking or obfuscating the gradients would fail to bring the
accuracy to zero even with an unbounded attack. As can be seen,
unbounded attacks against Fortified Networks succeed when given
a sufficiently large ε, which is evidence against gradient masking.
and Fortified Networks use a learned denoising autoencoder
in the hidden states of a network. A major difference is that
the denoising feature matching work focused on generative
adversarial networks and tried to minimize reconstruction
error through a learned generator network, whereas our
approach targets the adversarial examples problem. Addi-
tionally, our objective encourages the output of the DAE
to denoise adversarial examples so as to point back to the
hidden state of the original example, which is different from
the objective in the denoising feature matching work, which
encouraged reconstruction error to be low on states from
samples from the generator network.
6.4. Adversarial Spheres
Gilmer et al. (2018) studied the existence of adversarial
examples in the task of classifying between two hollow
concentric shells. Intriguingly, they prove and construct ad-
versarial examples which lie on the data manifold (although
Ilyas et al. (2017) also looked for such examples experi-
mentally using GANs). The existence of such on-manifold
adversarial examples demonstrates that a simplified version
of our model trained with onlyLrec could not protect against
all adversarial examples. However, training with Ladv en-
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courages the fortified layers to map back from points which
are not only off of the manifold, but also to map back from
points which are hard to classify, allowing Fortified Net-
works to also potentially help with on-manifold adversarial
examples as well.
7. Conclusion
Protecting against adversarial examples could be of
paramount importance in mission-critical applications. We
have presented Fortified Networks, a simple method for
the robustification of existing deep neural networks. Our
method is
• Practical: fortifying an existing network entails intro-
ducing DAEs between the hidden layers of the network
and can be automated. We are preparing a PyTorch
module that does exactly that and will release it for
the deep learning community to use shortly. Further-
more, the DAE reconstruction error at test time is a
reliable signal of distribution shift, that is examples un-
like those encountered during training. High error can
signify either adversarial attacks or significant domain
shift; both are important cases for the analyst or system
to be aware of.
• Effective: We showed results that improve upon the
state of the art on defenses for adversarial attacks on
MNIST and provides improvement on CIFAR and
Fashion-MNIST.
Limitations The cost of the proposed method is the ex-
tended training time due to the search for an adversarial
example and training the autoencoder. The added cost of the
fortified layers over adversarial training by itself is relatively
small, and is also much easier and simpler than training a
full generative model (such as a GAN) in the input space.
Layer fortification typically involves smaller DAEs that
require less computation. Additionally, we have shown im-
provements on ResNets where only two fortified layers are
added, and thus the change to the computational cost is very
slightly. At the same time, fortified networks have only
been shown to improve robustness when used alongside
adversarial training, which is expensive for iterative attacks.
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Appendix
A. Experimental Setup
All attacks used in this work were carried out using the
Cleverhans (Nicolas Papernot, 2017) library.
A.1. White-box attacks
Our convolutional models (Conv, in the tables) have 2
strided convolutional layers with 64 and 128 filters followed
by an unstrided conv layer with 128 filters. We use ReLU
activations between layers then followed by a single fully
connected layer. The convolutional and fully-connected
DAEs have a single bottleneck layer with leaky ReLU acti-
vations with some ablations presented in the table below.
With white-box PGD attacks, we used only convolutional
DAEs at the first and last conv layers with Gaussian noise
of σ = 0.01 whereas with FGSM attacks we used a DAE
only at the last fully connected layer. The weight on the
reconstruction error λrec and adversarial cost λadv were set
to 0.01 in all white-box attack experiments. We used the
Adam optimizer with a learning rate of 0.001 to train all
models.
The table below lists results a few ablations with different
activation functions in the autoencoder
Table 8. More detailed version of table 5, but with more detailed
ablation experiments for our method included. Accuracies against
white-box MNIST attacks with FGSM, where the model is a
convolutional net. We used the standard FGSM attack parameters
with an ε of 0.3 and compare against published adversarial training
defenses. We also performed ablations where we considered
removing the reconstruction error on adversarial examples Ladv
as well as switching the activation function in the fortified layers
from leaky relu to tanh, which we found to slightly help in this case.
Model FGSM
Adv. Train (Madry et al., 2017) 95.60
Adv. Train (Jacob Buckman, 2018) 96.17
Adv. Train (ours) 96.36
Adv. Train No-Rec (ours) 96.47
Quantized (Jacob Buckman, 2018) 96.29
One-Hot (Jacob Buckman, 2018) 96.22
Thermometer (Jacob Buckman, 2018) 95.84
Our Approaches
Fortified Network - Conv, w/o Ladv , lrelu 96.46
Fortified Network - Conv, lrelu 97.69
Fortified Network - Conv, tanh 97.97
A.2. Black-box attacks
Our black-box results are based on a fully-connected substi-
tute model (input-200-200-output), which was subsequently
used to attack a fortified convolutional network. The CNN
was trained for 50 epochs using adversarial training, and
the predictions of the trained CNN were used to train the
substitute model. 6 iterations of Jacobian data augmentation
were run during training of the substitute, with λ = 0.1.
The test set data holdout for the adversary was fixed to 150
examples. The learning rate was set to 0.003 and the Adam
optimizer was used to train both models.
